You should specifically contact the host`s security offices and winning elements as soon as program-specific security requirements can be identified. Depending on the existence and nature of waiver statements, the process can be long and complex. Early and consistent coordination will slightly increase the likelihood of co-use of CFIs, but wisely. And all this takes time. Co-use agreements are usually coordinated between the security office of the element that sponsored the host SCIF and the security office of the extraction or tenant element. For example, if a company has an NGO-accredited SCIF, but wants the SCIF to support an NGA program, the NGA Security Office cooperates with the NGO Security Office to ensure that all NGA rules related to SCIFs are followed. The result is that IC program managers and security experts in the sector are constantly working to compensate for a tension: a political environment that, on the one hand, favors the development and approval of a co-use agreement; and, on the other hand, a practical need to reconcile declarations of renunciation. A tenant and an alleged host agree on the purpose; However, the tenant must ensure that its unique mission requirements can be met by the host`s accreditation requirements, as well as any exceptions granted by the host element to uniform security requirements. And the same goes for the director of the National Secret Service (DNI).
In 2010, the DNI adopted Community Intelligence Directive (ICD) 705, which aimed to establish uniform physical and technical security requirements (IC) for all SCIFs. The stated objective was to “promote the effective, consistent and reciprocal use of ICS within the CI”. ICD 705 (B) (1). The objective of the mandate was to ensure that from that date, all CFIS were built, operated and maintained for reciprocal use by all elements of the ICR. See ICD 705 (D) (7). But there was a catch. Despite the DNI`s best intentions, SCIFs – like costumes – are not a “one size fits all”. A little sewing is always necessary. As I said recently by a nice IC program manager, “We have different requirements depending on the work that is done.” Thus, the original DCI provided for a narrow exception: in the case of indefinite “exceptional circumstances”, it is possible to waive uniform security requirements. In a short period of time, the diversity and complexity of ICR`s various programs has resulted in a large number of renunciations. Soon, the exception would swallow the rule.
Today, depending on the requirements of the mission, there are declarations of renunciation, both where uniform security requirements can only be met and when they need to be exceeded. See generally ICS 705-1 (H) (a) – (b). Thus, today`s accredited CFIs are very different in terms of compliance with “uniform” requirements; some hit them, some overtake them and others are too short….